Israeli intelligence services are believed to be turning to social media to gather information and recruit potential informants in Lebanon and Iran, according to security experts, using online advertisements and appeals tailored to local audiences.
uncertain
services → believe → audiences
One Instagram account, presenting itself as belonging to Israel’s foreign intelligence agency Mossad, has published Arabic-language messages encouraging people to make contact through confidential channels.
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account → present → channels
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The account, which is verified and operates under the handle @themossad_official, has posted recruitment appeals in colloquial Lebanese Arabic, including inviting people to explore new opportunities by initiating a private conversation.
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which → target → conversation
The profile prominently features pinned highlight reels with Arabic titles such as “Lebanon” displaying a photo of fighters, “Israel”, “Mossad wants you!”, “Protection”, and “Think about your future”.
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Mossad → feature → future
In August 2025, Lebanon’s General Security Directorate warned residents against interacting with the Instagram account.
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Directorate → warn → account
In Lebanon, where years of economic turmoil have left many residents facing financial hardship, security officials have warned of suspected Israeli intelligence recruitment efforts involving social media.
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officials → leave → media
In January 2025, the Lebanese newspaper Al Akhbar reported that Israeli intelligence operatives were attempting to recruit Lebanese citizens through fake job advertisements offering high salaries, and through direct outreach on WhatsApp.
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operatives → report → WhatsApp
Retired Brigadier General Mounir Chehade told the newspaper that the recruitment efforts targeted areas with significant support for Hezbollah, including Beirut’s southern suburbs, southern Lebanon and the Bekaa Valley.
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efforts → retire → suburbs
Also in January 2025, Lebanon’s General Security Directorate warned against interacting with a Facebook page called SAWA, which it suspected was a Mossad front aimed at recruiting Lebanese citizens.
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it → warn → citizens
Similarly, in December 2025, another Lebanese newspaper L’Orient Today reported that the security agency had warned residents against interacting with a social media page calling itself “Unit 504”.
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agency → report → itself
The page claimed to represent the Israeli military’s human intelligence unit and said it was looking for individuals interested in joining its ranks.
The concerns have been accompanied by arrests of people accused of passing sensitive information to Israel.
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concerns → claim → Israel
were reported in October 2025 to have previously arrested 32 people suspected of giving information to Israel that was used to target Hezbollah leaders.
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that → report → leaders
Academic and political researcher Wissam Nassif Yassin told Al Jazeera that Israeli intelligence uses colloquial Lebanese Arabic on these platforms to avoid arousing suspicion and to facilitate communication.
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intelligence → tell → communication
“The Israeli side focuses on all segments of society because it considers that every person can be penetrated from their own angle, based on the fact that Hezbollah in Lebanon is integrated into the core of Lebanese society,” Yassin said.
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Yassin → focus → society
“It focuses on the party’s members primarily, then on the resistance environment secondarily, and on the environment surrounding it thirdly.”
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It → focus → it
While Israel has had notable sucesses in its intelligence operations in Lebanon – including in gathering information leading to attacks on Hezbollah leaders and members, Yassin argued that collaboration with Israel remained widely rejected in Lebanon.
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collaboration → have → Lebanon
He also pointed to Hezbollah’s own counterintelligence capabilities, arguing that the group has a long history of identifying and disrupting Israeli intelligence activity.
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group → point → activity
Yassin pointed to the case of Elhanan Tannenbaum, an alleged Israeli spy who was captured in 2000 after being lured abroad, and was released in 2004 in a prisoner exchange deal.
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who → point → deal
Intelligence war
The use of digital platforms to recruit potential informants also forms part of the longstanding intelligence war between Israel and Iran, which has intensified alongside the military conflict between the two countries.
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which → recruit → countries
Hassan Ahmadian, an assistant professor of political science at the University of Tehran, described the current situation as one of the most intense periods in decades-long espionage between the two countries.
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Ahmadian → describe → countries
The confrontation between Iran and Israel has continued for decades, but in recent years it has reached its peak,” Ahmadian told Al Jazeera.
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Ahmadian → continue → Jazeera
“Both sides are engaged in intelligence operations.
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sides → engage → operations
It is an intense conflict that has never stopped.”
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that → stop → ?
Ahmadian said that Israeli recruitment efforts in Iran were sometimes carried out through openly advertised opportunities on social media.
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efforts → say → media
“Israel certainly uses online advertising to recruit people,” he said.
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he → use → people
“When I was in Iran, I would see advertisements on social media seeking analysts or people to work in security, sometimes offering high salaries and inviting interested applicants to visit a particular page.
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I → see → page
He suggested that openly advertising such opportunities could have a psychological goal beyond recruiting informants, in an attempt to reinforce perceptions of Israel’s intelligence reach inside Iran.
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advertising → suggest → Iran
“Israel uses propaganda, but this blatant method is perhaps partly to amplify the Israeli presence,” Ahmadian noted.
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Ahmadian → use → presence
The academic also pointed to cases in which Iran had conducted its own counter-operations.
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Iran → point → operations
In October 2024, for example, Israeli authorities announced the arrest of seven Israeli nationals accused of spying for Iran by gathering intelligence on military facilities and other sensitive sites.
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authorities → announce → facilities
Separately, the former Israeli Energy Minister Gonen Segev was arrested in 2018 on accusations of spying for Iran.
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Segev → arrest → Iran
He subsequently pled guilty and was sentenced to 11 years in prison in 2019.
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He → plead → 2019
Authorities in Lebanon and Iran have threatened severe penalties for anyone interacting with Israeli accounts.
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Authorities → threaten → accounts
In July, the Iranian newspaper Kayhan reported that Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence had warned of social media accounts allegedly set up by Mossad to extract information and spread fake news following recent security operations.
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Ministry → report → operations
The ministry claimed that Mossad even offered medical advice to people injured during the United States-Israeli war on Iran, in an attempt to gather sensitive intelligence.
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Mossad → claim → intelligence
In the same month, the Iranian judiciary also warned that sending images or information to networks deemed to be hostile could result in sentences of 10 to 15 years in prison, heavy fines and potential charges of “corruption on Earth”, which carries the death penalty.
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which → warn → penalty
In Lebanon, collaboration with Israel carries a penalty of imprisonment.
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collaboration → carry → imprisonment
As the covert conflict expands online, Ahmadian said that there was little indication that the confrontation would ease.
“I do not expect this intelligence war to stop at any moment between the two parties,” Ahmadian said, “it will remain ongoing and will continue to affect the entire conflict.”
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it → expand → conflict
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