On Friday morning, I hosted a Reddit AMA, in which participants could ask me anything.
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participants → host → anything
But the questions were practically all related to my new book: How Russia Won: Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, and the Fight for America.
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Russia → relate → America
The queries were smart, and none were vituperative—which was surprising given that this topic has become so toxic because of Trump’s BS insistence that “Russia, Russia, Russia” is a Deep State “hoax” and “witch hunt” orchestrated to destroy him.
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topic → give → him
Here’s an excerpt of the Reddit conversation.
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excerpt → ’ → conversation
You can learn more about the book at HowRussiaWon.com.
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You → learn → HowRussiaWon.com
With Russia’s equivalent of midterm elections happening today, tomorrow, and on Sunday, what do you think the level of US interference in Russia’s election is?
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level → happen → election
Also, historically—say, from the 1990s to now, if we take Russia’s interference in the US as 100 percent—where would you put US interference in Russia?
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you → take → Russia
We know that historically, Russia has long accused the US and the West of intervening in its domestic affairs.
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Russia → know → affairs
And indeed, throughout the Cold War, the US ran covert actions around the world that intervened in elections and operations that helped overturn democratically elected governments (such as in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile).
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that → run → Iran
But I’ve seen no evidence that the US is doing anything like that in recent years in Russia.
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US → see → Russia
Of course, there are intelligence operations that target Russia and Putin.
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that → be → Russia
But given that Russia is a closed society, without free media, in which dissidence is crushed and critics imprisoned and killed, there’s much less opportunity for the sort of information operations that Russia can target at an open society like the US and European nations.
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Russia → give → US
Are there signs that the war with Ukraine has affected their ability to interfere with our election due to the allocation of resources?
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war → affect → resources
After Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, much of the Russian disinformation operations focused on the war.
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much → focus → war
Two main lines of false narrative were purported corruption (Zelenskyy is using millions of dollars to buy yachts!) and the bogus charge that the US was running bioweapons labs in Ukraine—an allegation that Tucker Carlson, Tulsi Gabbard, and other MAGA/right-wing influencers embraced and amplified (as I detail in my book).
But during the 2024 campaign, Russian intelligence pivoted to direct its disinfo ops toward the US election—to disparage Biden
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intelligence → purport → election
And in recent days, we have seen one of those disinfo networks—dubbed Matryoshka—which I wrote about in the book, start to target the midterms to disparage Democrats and encourage votes for the GOP.
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I → see → GOP
Do you have specific examples of what these disinformation campaigns looked like, what each of their intents was, and the platforms they used to do so?
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they → have → intents
Here’s one
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one → ’ → ?
: During the 2024 campaign, a Russian disinformation operator—an American fugitive cop living in Moscow named John Mark Dougan—appeared on a show on Rumble, a conservative video platform, hosted by a QAnoner and presented a man (in silhouette with his voice altered) who claimed he had been a Kazakhstan exchange student at the Minnesota high school where Gov. Tim Walz had once taught and coached football.
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Walz → live → football
This anonymous person said Walz had inappropriately touched him.
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Walz → say → him
This baseless allegation—it turned out there were no exchange students from Kazakhstan at the time—was then spread across a network of phony websites set up by Dougan that had real-sounding names: The Boston Times, the New York News Daily, the Miami Chronicle, and was soon picked up by American social media users and went viral across assorted social media platforms.
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that → turn → platforms
Eventually, Jack Posobiec, a MAGA influencer who gave us the bonkers Pizzagate conspiracy theory and was then working for the Trump campaign, and Candace Owens, another MAGA influencer, amplified this allegation.
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who → give → allegation
It’s a good bet that this baseless charge was seen by over 10 million Americans.
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charge → ’ → Americans
Now, how do you stop something like that?
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you → stop → that
Well, social media platforms could do moderating.
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platforms → do → moderating
More importantly, political operatives and influencers could behave more responsibly.
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operatives → behave → ?
I know.
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I → know → ?
But we also can try to encourage everyone to be more discerning in what they pass along.
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they → try → what
Disinfo ops work best when the phony narratives are embraced and transmitted by real people.
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narratives → work → people
How to stop that is a challenge.
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stop → stop → that
When Russia interferes using influencers, are the influencers even aware?
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influencers → interfere → influencers
Or does Russia just pump money into influencers they believe have the talking points that disrupt or push their agenda?
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that → pump → agenda
The best disinformation ops produce false narratives that become embraced and spread by authentic accounts—that is, real Americans.
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that → produce → accounts
And we have seen numerous cases in which Russian disinfo slipped into US social media is then widely amplified by MAGA influencers and even Republican officeholders.
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slipped → see → influencers
And there’s the Tenet Media case, in which RT, the Russian state-controlled propaganda outlet, funneled $10 million to MAGA influencers, including Benny Johnson and Tim Pool, who claim they did not know the exorbitant payments they were receiving—far above normal levels—came from Moscow.
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they → ’ → Moscow
But you have to ask: Why was Russia willing to provide millions to these pro-Trump influencers?
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Russia → have → influencers
What does it say about their role in the information ecosystem?
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it → say → ecosystem
Trump lifted restrictions on using US-supplied weapons for long-distance strikes inside Russia proper, including providing targeting assistance.
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Trump → lift → assistance
The blockade of Venezuela saw a further crackdown on the shadow fleet, further restricting Russia’s export capacity.
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blockade → see → capacity
The Russia-friendly Assad regime in Syria has collapsed, and the Russian forces stationed there have been forced to flee.
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forces → collapse → Syria
…and 25 more, not listed.
The Aporia
