NOVELIST DANIEL SILVA HAS SPENT decades writing international thrillers about intelligence operations, sabotage, and shadow wars unfolding across Europe.
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SILVA → spend → Europe
His recent number-one bestseller, Ransom, features asymmetric drone attacks that will seem eerily familiar to readers following security news from Europe, where headlines this month told of myriad bomb threats to commercial aircraft, forcing flight diversions, emergency landings, and even the scrambling of NATO fighter aircraft.
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headlines → feature → aircraft
Operations at airports across Europe have been disrupted, prompting the mobilization of emergency services.1
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Operations → disrupt → mobilization
News organizations in Ireland, the U.K., and Bulgaria have also received threats, including emails saying, “A Message to the West.”
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organizations → receive → West
An individual identifying himself as “Mikhail Andropov” claimed responsibility for the threats and promised more to come.
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individual → identify → more
According to a November 6 analysis by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), more than fifty threats against European aviation were reported in just the first few days of the month, and eighteen media organizations were targeted on November 6 alone.
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organizations → accord → November
By the following week, the messages had begun threatening thousands of schools in Italy, leading to hundreds of evacuations.
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messages → begin → evacuations
(Similar threats were directed at schools in Scotland, Northern Ireland, and the Republic of Ireland.)
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threats → direct → Ireland
And more threats came this week, with over a hundred Italian schools on Monday receiving emails with the initials “M.A.” warning of the presence of bombs and now something new: poison in the school cafeteria food.
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schools → come → food
In its analysis, ISW did not blame Russia directly, but instead noted that the threats, which seem to be intended to “disrupt European society and impose economic costs,” were “consistent with Russian approaches.”
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which → blame → approaches
To understand why requires some insight into the Russian psyche—and specifically into how Russian strategists view conflict and intimidation.
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strategists → understand → conflict
WHILE THE METHODS HAVE CHANGED over the decades, the use of intimidation to test Western resolve is familiar.
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use → change → resolve
I saw it play out in various ways across my own career.
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it → see → career
NATO had fifteen member nations at that time (up from the founding twelve in 1949).
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NATO → have → 1949
The alliance’s resources and energies were focused on the threat of conventional forces clashing in places like the Fulda and Meiningen Gaps.
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forces → focus → Gaps
But even then, the Soviets conducted a variety of sanctioned reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence actions—activities usually kept covert—under the guise of the Soviet Military Liaison Mission (SMLM, or “smell-em,” as we American soldiers called them).
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soldiers → conduct → them
Soviet intelligence officials would drive around West Germany in Ladas with unique but approved license plates, making note of NATO maneuvers, plotting base locations, and even recording the actions of soldiers and their families during off-duty hours.
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officials → drive → hours
During my next tour in 1988–91, things began to change: overt Russian threats diminished dramatically after the fall of the Berlin Wall.
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threats → begin → Wall
Then, after the Soviet Union’s collapse, NATO stopped focusing on Soviet armored formations.
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NATO → stop → formations
The alliance experimented with new kinds of cooperation: As over 150,000 U.S. forces were deployed from Europe to the Middle East for Desert Storm, several NATO nations joined the effort in what the alliance termed “out-of-area operations.”
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alliance → experiment → area
Also, during the ’90s, several newly independent and former Warsaw Pact nations—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, and others—felt threatened by a potentially resurgent and increasingly belligerent Russia, or by regional instability, ethnic conflict, and territorial disputes.
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nations → feel → instability
(The Baltic States and Poland fell into the first category; the Balkans and the former Yugoslavia fell into the latter.)
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Balkans → fall → latter
Several of these joined the alliance; by 1999, NATO reached nineteen members.
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NATO → join → members
Meanwhile, though, after decades of the Cold War, the West’s relationship with Russia began to warm during the late 1990s and early 2000s.
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relationship → begin → 1990s
Russian forces participated alongside NATO forces during operations in Bosnia (1996) and Kosovo (1999), and they were also cooperating then, as now, with Serbia.2
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they → participate → Bosnia
And military-to-military engagements increased; Russia joined many exercises with NATO forces.
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Russia → increase → forces
(For example, Exercise Torgau, started in 2004, was a yearly military training exercise named for the village where Soviet and U.S. forces linked up at the end of WWII.)
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forces → start → WWII
I was asked to join a five-person delegation participating in an initiative called “Partnership for Peace” that traveled to Russia to share military information and look for future opportunities between our two countries and within the region.
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that → ask → region
When I returned to Europe after being deployed to Iraq in 2003–04, we began offering multinational training opportunities to our NATO Allies and European partners at the U.S. Grafenwoehr Training Center, where I commanded.
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I → return → Center
Russia asked to participate in several of these, though they always included political officers with the soldiers when they came, even when they sent one group of soldiers to our Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) training school.
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they → ask → school
As a new brigadier general commanding a critical training facility, I began receiving daily European intelligence updates in 2004.
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I → command → 2004
I remember a distinct uptick in what the intelligence community calls “reflections” about the actions of Vladimir Putin, who had ascended to the presidency of Russia four years earlier.
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who → remember → Russia
One of my intel reads described the Beslan school siege in detail, suggesting that Putin used that September 2004 crisis to end popular elections for regional governors and further centralize his political authority.
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Putin → describe → authority
Russia’s political institutions were becoming significantly more entrenched, and we began to see fewer engagements and more fomenting of covert operations coming from our Russian friends.
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engagements → become → friends
Over the next several years, as I stayed in Europe and moved to other jobs, Russian actions made up a good portion of the intelligence bulletins.
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actions → stay → bulletins
Most intelligence analysts at the time began to see that Russia was relying more on unconventional methods to intimidate its European neighbors.
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Russia → begin → neighbors
The November 2006 assassination of Alexander Litvinenko—an FSB officer who had defected to Britain—by radioactive polonium-210 poisoning, the extensive Estonian cyberattacks in April and May 2007, and the massive amount of information operations that preceded the eventual conventional incursion into Georgia’s South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions in 2008 were some of the more overt Russian ops.
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that → defect → ops
I left Europe in 2009 but returned in 2011 to command U.S. Army forces.
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I → leave → forces
The initial intelligence briefing provided by the staff, with input from various agencies, included a growing stream of reports describing Russian intimidation and activities that were increasing in scope, sophistication, and frequency across the continent.
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that → provide → continent
Though I traveled to Russia several times, and the two Russian Ground Forces commanders I engaged with (Col-Gen. Aleksandr Postnikov-Streltsov and Col-Gen. Vladimir Chirkin) visited our headquarters, there was little effective cooperation or coordination, and there was always a requirement to ensure that Russian active collection—being targeted by intelligence agencies—did not succeed against us when we went to Moscow or they came to Heidelberg.
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they → travel → Heidelberg
…and 21 more, not listed.