This week, Moscow will host the third Russia-Africa summit, bringing together African leaders as President Vladimir Putin seeks to expand Russia’s economic, military and political reach across the continent.
asserted
Putin → host → continent
Yet Russia’s growing influence has done far more to advance Moscow’s interests and protect allied rulers than to deliver the prosperity and security promised to ordinary Africans.
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influence → grow → Africans
Putin is scheduled to cochair Thursday’s plenary session with Burundian President Evariste Ndayishimiye, current chair of the African Union.
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Putin → schedule → Union
Alongside the summit, a two-day economic and humanitarian forum will discuss investment, industrial production, food security, energy, technology and payment systems.
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forum → discuss → investment
Organisers have placed trade and investment at the centre of the programme with a new plan for 2027-2029 expected to advance what they call “mutually beneficial cooperation”.
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they → place → what
On August 20, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Maria Zakharova outlined plans for another substantial round of intergovernmental agreements and commercial contracts at the Moscow summit.
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Zakharova → outline → summit
The Sochi gathering in October 2019 produced 92 agreements, and Putin pledged to double annual trade to $40bn.
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Putin → produce → 40bn
Four years later, the July 2023 summit in St Petersburg yielded 161 more accords and a 2023-2026 action plan.
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summit → yield → accords
The economic results have not matched Moscow’s promises.
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results → match → promises
As the 2023-2026 plan nears its conclusion, Russia’s own trade statistics expose the shortfall: Merchandise trade with Africa reached just $27.1bn in 2025 against Putin’s $40bn target.
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trade → near → target
The trade imbalance persisted into 2026 with Russia exporting $14bn in goods to Africa during the first eight months of the year while importing just $3.2bn.
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Russia → persist → 3.2bn
Agricultural exports help explain Africa’s significant trade deficit with Russia.
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exports → help → Russia
In the first half of 2026 alone, Russia shipped 10.2 million tonnes of wheat to Africa, with Egypt its largest agricultural customer.
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Egypt → ship → Africa
These supplies meet genuine food security needs, but exports of wheat and fertiliser benefit Russian producers more than they contribute to African industrial development.
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they → meet → development
Russia’s investment record exposes a substantial gap between agreements signed and projects completed.
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record → expose → agreements
At the 2019 summit, fertiliser producer Uralchem and Angola’s Grupo Opaia agreed to build a $1.2bn ammonia and urea complex, scheduled to begin production in 2023, but Uralchem abandoned the venture that year.
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Uralchem → agree → venture
Egypt offers clearer evidence of progress: Rosatom is building four nuclear reactors at El Dabaa, where more than 18,000 Egyptians are employed in their construction.
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Egyptians → offer → construction
But the project is being financed largely through a $25bn Russian loan that Egypt must repay with interest.
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Egypt → finance → interest
Even when Russian-backed projects advance, the contract terms determine who stands to benefit, who bears the financial risks and how public revenues will ultimately be shared.
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revenues → back → risks
In the Republic of Congo, a proposed petroleum-products pipeline between Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville would give Russian interests 90 percent of the joint venture and Congo’s state oil company 10 percent with a 25-year concession and guaranteed transport tariffs.
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pipeline → propose → concession
In April, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak said design work would begin this year with operations planned for 2029.
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work → say → 2029
Russian officials have also described the pipeline as a means of protecting petroleum exports from Western sanctions imposed following Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
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officials → describe → Ukraine
Russia’s commercial ambitions are matched by a widening military footprint.
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ambitions → match → footprint
On October 8, Sweden’s Defence Research Agency identified at least 57 Russian military and security agreements involving 39 African countries, although many remain limited in practice.
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many → identify → practice
Others facilitate training and access to military infrastructure.
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Others → facilitate → infrastructure
Russia initially relied on the Wagner Group, a Kremlin-linked mercenary network, before transferring many operations to the Ministry of Defence-controlled Africa Corps with Wagner remaining active in the Central African Republic.
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Wagner → rely → Republic
Russian personnel provide direct combat assistance, training and protection to allied governments, particularly in Mali and the Central African Republic.
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personnel → provide → Mali
Nonetheless, Mali exposes the limits of Russia’s military assistance.
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Mali → expose → assistance
Wagner fighters and Malian troops captured Kidal, a strategic northern city, in November 2023, only to lose it to separatist rebels in April 2026.
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fighters → capture → April
On October 6, Russian-backed forces regained the city after an air campaign prompted the rebels to withdraw.
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campaign → back → rebels
Moscow has helped Mali win territory, but it has failed to deliver lasting security for Malians.
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it → help → Malians
According to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project, Malian forces and Russia’s Africa Corps carried out 49 air strikes from April to August, killing 89 civilians.
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forces → accord → civilians
Human Rights Watch reported that on July 10, Africa Corps fighters killed nine people, including four children, and burned homes in Bombori, a village in central Mali’s Mopti region.
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fighters → report → region
Other abuses include beatings, electric shocks and waterboarding of noncombatants detained by Malian soldiers and Africa Corps personnel at a military base in Sevare from May to August.
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abuses → include → August
For civilians caught between insurgents and forces sent to defeat them, Moscow’s military assistance has brought more violence and no dependable protection.
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assistance → catch → violence
At the same time, Russia has proved its value to allied rulers in the region.
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Russia → prove → region
On August 29, Russia’s Africa Corps helped General Abdourahamane Tiani crush a mutiny in Niger.
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Tiani → help → Niger
Russian troops provided ground and aerial support, and Moscow’s ambassador confirmed their role.
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ambassador → provide → role
While Tiani’s government survived, Nigeriens remain without political parties or an election timetable, and civil liberties are severely restricted.
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liberties → survive → parties
The junta also stripped five more exiled critics of their nationality on September 17.
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junta → strip → September
…and 22 more, not listed.
The Aporia
