Russia steps up election influence efforts in final stretch of midterms
Russian operatives are pumping out fabricated claims about Democratic candidates, AI-manipulated videos of celebrities and fake posts impersonating real news outlets in an effort to influence American voters in the final run-up to Election Day.
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operatives → step → Day
Researchers who track online influence operations and lawmakers who've been briefed by the intelligence community say Kremlin-backed groups are renewing familiar tactics they've used to sow distrust and discord in previous elections in the U.S. and around the world.
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they → track → world
"It's a carnival out there," Rep. Jim Himes of Connecticut, the ranking member on the House intelligence committee, told reporters this week.
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Himes → tell → reporters
"They're throwing everything out there to generate a sense of chaos and anarchy.
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They → throw → chaos
"
The goal is to exacerbate divisions, erode confidence in democracy and, crucially, undermine U.S. support for Ukraine.
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goal → exacerbate → Ukraine
"At the end of the day, the main issue for Russia is and has to be Ukraine," said Darren Linvill, co-director of Clemson University's Media Forensics Hub, who has tracked foreign propaganda campaigns for years.
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who → have → years
Linvill says the Russian playbook is consistent.
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playbook → say → ?
A false claim or divisive narrative is seeded on social media or on a fake website posing as a news organization or think tank.
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claim → seed → organization
It's spread by state media, automated fake accounts or, increasingly, paid influencers, in the hopes that it gets seen and repeated by real people.
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it → spread → people
"In the same way that marketing companies will pay an influencer to disseminate, you know, 'Nike's a great shoe,' the Russians do it with false information and made-up lies," he said.
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he → pay → information
"They use influencers that know their audience, that are part of that audience, and they know how to give that audience a message that they want to hear," Linvill said.
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Linvill → use → that
A Russian operation put that playbook to work this week to spread a baseless accusation against a Democratic U.S. Senate candidate.
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operation → put → candidate
Linvill and several other research groups attributed them to Russian operators the research community has dubbed Storm-1516.
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community → attribute → operators
It's known for staging fake videos with actors and laundering their claims through influencer accounts with large followings.
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It → know → followings
Two fraudulent videos targeting the Senate candidate were posted on Tuesday on X by an account created last month that had few followers.
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that → target → followers
The account's X profile said it was based in the U.S. but the social media platform publicly flagged it as possibly using a proxy such as a virtual private network, which could disguise its location.
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which → say → location
The videos were likely created using artificial intelligence, according to Graphika, a research company that analyzes online communities.
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that → create → communities
Linvill said a hallmark of Storm-1516 videos is the use of real actors whose faces are swapped using AI to look like someone else.
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faces → say → someone
The post was immediately shared by a network of 15 accounts Linvill flagged as bots.
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Linvill → share → bots
About 12 hours later, one of the videos was shared in new posts by three X accounts with large followings, which researchers said have previously amplified other narratives attributed to Storm-1516.
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researchers → share → Storm-1516
One of them has solicited paid partnerships on X.
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One → solicit → X.
Soon other X accounts began resharing the large accounts' posts in replies to politicians and journalists.
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accounts → begin → politicians
One of the two fake videos racked up roughly 857,000 views within 24 hours, according to an analysis by Alethea, a threat intelligence company.
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One → rack → Alethea
By late on Wednesday, the account that first posted the videos and one of the large accounts that reshared the claim had been suspended by X, and the two other large accounts that amplified it had taken down their posts.
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that → post → posts
In the run-up to the 2024 presidential election, Storm-1516 posted fraudulent videos making similar unfounded accusations against Democratic vice presidential nominee Tim Walz and purporting to show ballots for President Trump being torn up.
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Storm-1516 → post → Trump
Linvill says the operation tries to glom on to narratives that are already circulating among Americans.
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that → say → Americans
"It is hard to persuade anybody of anything, ever," he said.
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he → persuade → anything
"But what you can do is reinforce beliefs."
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do → reinforce → beliefs
This election cycle, Russian operations have also spread messages about Democrats turning away from supporting Israel and fabricated news reports accusing Democratic candidates of corruption.
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Democrats → spread → corruption
"I increasingly have come to think of Russia as essentially a dark money PAC," said Lisa Kaplan, who founded Alethea.
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who → come → Alethea
"You know they're going to be running advertisements.
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they → know → advertisements
You want to understand what's out there.
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what → want → ?
You want to understand if they're actually effective in moving people in one direction or another."
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they → want → direction
Intelligence officials have long said Russia has favored Trump and targeted Democrats in its efforts to erode support for Ukraine in the U.S.
On Wednesday, Himes and Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., vice chairman of the Senate intelligence committee, told reporters they'd seen a recent classified intelligence report on foreign election meddling showing Russia opposes candidates of either party who have backed Ukraine.
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who → say → Ukraine
Himes stressed that while Russia and other foreign countries have sought to influence voters, there has been no indication that they have been able to interfere with the actual mechanics of voting.
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they → stress → voting
"Nothing out there suggests that there is either the capability or the intent to do interference, whereas there is a pretty robust influence environment," Himes said.
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Himes → suggest → interference
The same Russian operations now active in the U.S. midterms have also targeted elections this year in France, Germany and elsewhere.
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operations → target → France
They've used AI-generated audio and impersonated politicians, celebrities and media outlets, Graphika said in a new report on Friday.
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Graphika → use → Friday
"They have run this playbook in half a dozen other countries in the past six months throughout Europe.
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They → run → Europe
We're just the next in line," Linvill said.
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Linvill → say → line
…and 6 more, not listed.
The Aporia
